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INTRODUCTION
The Indian Child Welfare Act is referred to in this
reply brief as the "ICWA".

The legislative history of the Act is

referred to as the "House Report" for H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th
Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted at 1978 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7530, and the "BIA Guidelines" for "Part III, Department of the
Interior; Bureau of Indian Affairs; Guidelines for State Courts;
Indian Child Custody Proceedings", 44 Fed. Reg. 67584 (Nov. 26,
1979) .
The transcript of the hearing of April 7, 1983, is
referred to as Transcript I.

The transcript of the hearing of

October 22, 1984, is referred to as Transcript II. The consent
proceeding of May 30, 1980, is attached to this brief as Exhibit
K.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents1 Statement of Facts is virtually identical
to the Summary of Facts attached as an exhibit to Respondents'
brief.

As alleged

in Appellants1 recent Motion to Strike,

Respondents have deliberately distorted some of the relevant
testimony.

The Court is urged to read the actual testimony

rather than to rely on the summary prepared by Respondents.
Two examples are given to illustrate the nature of this
problem.

On page 3, line 14, Respondents allege that the natural

mother testified that there were times when Jeremiah was found
unattended because the grandmother was drunk.

This is false.

The only person who testified to this was Respondents' attorney.

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Twice he tried to put testimony into the mouth of the Navajo
Nation witnesses.

In both cases, he was expressly corrected, by

the natural mother (Transcript I, p.23, line 24) and the tribe's
social worker (Transcript I, p.136, lines 1-3), that there was
only one time when Jeremiah was taken into custody by the police.
Respondents also assert that the natural mother only
had limited contact with her son while he was on the reservation.
(Resp. Br. at 3-4, No.5). Again, this is false.

Cecelia testi-

fied that she saw Jeremiah almost everyday while he stayed with
his grandmother pursuant to tribal custom, Transcript I, p.25,
lines 14-16, and jjn addition used to have sole custody of him for
several days every couple of weeks. Transcript I, p.25, line 4;
p.26, lines 18-25.

2
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POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
OVER AN ADOPTION PROCEEDING INVOLVING
JEREMIAH HALLOWAY.
Respondents have attempted to completely mischaracterize this case as an intrusion into "areas of traditional state
interest."

Resp. Br. at 14.

proceeding, however, is wrong.

Respondent's view

Internal

of

this

affairs of a tribe are

historically the exclusive province of the tribe, and state
authority is completely preempted absent express legislative
permission by Congress.

The Indian Child Welfare Act is express

federal law designed to protect and even enhance tribal control
over Indian children.

Respondents1 argument that the ICWA is

designed to grant jurisdiction to states is absurd and without
merit.
The principles governing resolution of jurisdictional
disputes between Indian tribes and states were recently discussed
at great length by the Supreme Court in New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 US 324, 76 L Ed 2d 611, 103 S Ct 2378 (1978).
The Court noted at the beginning of its discussion the strong
presumption of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over

internal

affairs, holding that
in demarcating the respective spheres of state and
tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have
continued to stress that Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing "attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory." (citation).
Because of their sovereign status, tribes and their
reservation lands are insulated in some respects by a
(sic) "historic immunity from state and local control",

3
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Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US at 152, and
tribes retain any aspect 5F tEeiFhistorical status not
"inconsistent with the overriding interests of the
National Government." (citations).
The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the
power of regulating their internal and social relations", (citations). A tribe's power to prescribe the
conduct of tribal members has never been doubted, and
our cases establish that "absent governing Acts of
Congress", a State may not act in a manner that
"infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." (citations,
including Fisher v^ District Court, 424 US 382, 388-89
(1976) (adoption)).
462 US at 332-33.

The Supreme Court then d i s c u s s e d the r o l e of "Indian
preemption" in r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s between s t a t e s and t r i b e s .
After noting that preemption rules developed in regular constitut i o n a l c a s e s are i n a p p l i c a b l e when Indian a f f a i r s are involved
because of "'the unique h i s t o r i c a l origins of tribal sovereignty'
and the federal commitment to tribal s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y

and s e l f -

determination," 462 US at 334, the Court enunciated the rule of
Indian preemption:
S t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i s preempted by the operation of
f e d e r a l law i f i t i n t e r f e r e s or i s incompatible with
federal and t r i b a l i n t e r e s t s reflected in federal law,
u n l e s s the s t a t e i n t e r e s t s at stake are s u f f i c i e n t to
j u s t i f y the a s s e r t i o n of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y , ( c i t a t i o n s ,
including Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941)
( s t a t e a u t h o r i t y precluded when i t "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the f u l l purposes and
objectives of Congress")).
Certain broad considerations guide our assessment
of the f e d e r a l and t r i b a l i n t e r e s t s . The t r a d i t i o n a l
n o t i o n s of I n d i a n s o v e r e i g n t y p r o v i d e a c r u c i a l
"backdrop," ( c i t a t i o n s ) , against which any assertion of
s t a t e a u t h o r i t y must be a s s e s s e d . Moreover, both the
tribes and the Federal Government are firmly committed
to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal
embodied in numerous federal statutes.... Thus when a
4
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tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority of
federal law, an assertion of state authority must be
viewed against interference with the successful accomplishment of the federal purpose, (citations).
462 US at 334-36.
The United States Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion
has ruled that a state has no interest in an adoption proceeding
involving an Indian child arising on the reservation.

Fisher v.

District Court, 424 US 382, 47 L Ed 2d 106, 96 S Ct 943 (1976).
The Court concluded that:

"State-court jurisdiction plainly

would interfere with the powers of self-government conferred upon
the (tribe) and exercised through the Tribal Court.

It would

subject a dispute arising on the reservation among reservation
Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for
themselves."

424 US at 387-88.

The Court also found that there

was no federal statute which sanctioned state interference with
tribal self-government.

Id.

at 388.

The fact that the Fisher case involved only Indians
while in the present case the adoptive petitioners were nonIndians is of no impact.

As the Fisher decision noted, where the

litigation "arise(s) out of conduct of an Indian reservation,"
even disputes between non-Indians and Indians are subject to
exclusive tribal jurisdiction.

424 US at 386, citing Williams v.

Lee, 358 US 217, 220, 3 L Ed 2d 251, 79 S Ct 269 (1959).

All of

the conduct in the present case before the adoption petition was
filed took place on the Navajo reservation.

The Fisher decision

concluded that in an adoption proceeding, ""arising on the reser-

5
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vation" is determined by the legal residence of the parties.

The

ICWA adopted this standard by basing jurisdiction on the domicile
of the child.

25 USC Section 1911(a).

With this preliminary discussion in mind, the ICWA
itself must be looked at to discern its intent.

Nothing in the

ICWA evidences any intent to interfere with the well-settled
rules of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
involving Indian children discussed above.

Section 1911(a) was

included to expressly preserve this jurisdiction, and the legislative history states that the section's intent is to confirm
Federal and State law which holds that a tribe has exclusive
jurisdiction over its children.

House Report, supra, at 21.

Congress recognized its duty to protect and preserve Indian
tribes and their children, 25 USC Sections 1901(2), (3), and
found that there was no greater threat to the integrity of tribal
self-government

than the loss of a tribe's children.

I^d. The

express policy of the ICWA is to "[defer] to tribal judgment on
matters concerning

the custody of tribal children."

BIA

Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed Reg at 67585, Section A.l (Policy).
Section 1911(a) takes up but a small part of the ICWA's
space, but it is the most significant piece of the Act.

The

remainder of the Act covers only that small portion of Indian
child custody proceedings where the State is exercising its
"recognized" judicial and administrative jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings.

25 USC Section 1901(5).

This recog-

nized jurisdiction, as discussed above, exists only where it has

6
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not been preempted by inherent tribal sovereignty or federal law.
Then the Act goes further.

Even where a state has valid juris-

diction over an Indian child, the ICWA intrudes significantly
into this "traditional state area" by requiring the state court
to follow federal standards rather than its own laws, 25 USC
Section 1902, and even to give up its own recognized jurisdiction
upon the request of the tribe unless good cause to the contrary
exists.
16.

25 USC Section 1911(b).

See House Report, supra at

13-

To argue that the ICWA contemplates a loss of tribal juris-

diction in the face of such plain statutory language is patently
absurd.
The facts of the present case create precise legal
implications under this analysis.

Jurisdiction was clearly with

the Navajo Nation under any theory of law up to the time Cecelia
Saunders executed her consent to adoption before the tribal
court. Jeremiah grew up on the reservation.

Both the mother and

grandmother have always resided and been domiciled on the reservation.

The Navajo tribal government was exerting voluntary

jurisdiction over Jeremiah and his family by providing a variety
of social services to them.
It is undisputed that when Jeremiah was first removed
from the reservation the mother thought it was for the purpose of
foster placement only (Transcript I, p.53, lines 22-25).

The

aunt who removed Jeremiah, Polly Dick, concealed the fact that
she had already made arrangements to place Jeremiah for adoption
in a non-Indian home, (Transcript I, p.66, lines 17-19, and p.78,

7
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lines 7-16), and only broached the subject of adoption with
Cecelia after Jeremiah had been placed

for over a month

(Transcript I, p.32, lines 6-8). The first formal evidence of
any intent to consent to adoption took place at the consent
proceeding of May 30, 1980 (Exhibit K).
This point is important

because it is this brief

consent hearing, and the consent executed in front of the court
at that time, which the trial court ruled effected a change of
domicile from the Navajo Nation to the State of Utah.
Ruling of July 14, 1982).

(gee

The ICWA requires that a voluntary

consent must be executed before a judge to be effective when an
Indian child is involved.

25 USC Section 1913(a).

Yet what was

the jurisdiction of the Fourth Judicial District Court to receive
that consent?

If, as the trial court held, the domicile of

Jeremiah Halloway was changed when Cecelia Saunders executed her i
consent where was his domicile immediately before?
obvious —
mother.

The answer is j

it was on the reservation with his mother or grand-

Yet if this was the case, how did the state court have I

jurisdiction to hear her consent, when the case law and ICWA
state without equivocation that a tribal court has exclusive I
jurisdiction over such consents and all other aspects of adoption *
proceedings involving Indian children.

25 USC Section 1911(a);

Fisher v. District Court, supra; Wakefield y-![ LittleLight, 347 A I
2d 228 (Md. App. 1975).

Indeed, the holding of Fisher is that an

adult Indian cannot waive the exclusive jurisdiction of the I
tribal court by leaving the reservation and invoking the juris- rj

8
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d i c t i o n of the s t a t e court.

F i s h e r , supra, 424 US at 390-91;

Wakefield v. L i t t l e L i g h t , 347 A 2d at 239 (party may not confer
subject matter jurisdiction by consent).

If the attempted waiver

of t r i b a l j u r i s d i c t i o n was void in Fisher where the l i t i g a n t s
l e f t the r e s e r v a t i o n to invoke s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n , how can a
different result be j u s t i f i e d where the only off-reservation act
was the execution of a consent to adoption?
The t r i a l court committed error by bootstrapping i t s e l f
into jurisdiction.

The court should have determined the domicile

of Jeremiah Halloway before i t took the consent of
Saunders on May 30, 1980.

Cecelia

The t r a n s c r i p t of that proceeding

shows, however, that while the court made some general inquiries
as to where the mother resided, i t never made a determination of
d o m i c i l e as required by the ICWA.

E x h i b i t K, i n f r a ;

25 USC

Section 1911(a); Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F
Supp 719, 731 (D.W.D. Mich, N.D. 1973)

("the o n l y

rational

approach i s to determine the domicile of the children at the time
their physical custody was gained" by the s t a t e court).

Instead

i t assumed that i t had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o r e c e i v e the mother's
consent,
consent.

at which time i t
As was d i s c u s s e d

took j u r i s d i c t i o n based on t h a t
in Appellants 1 opening b r i e f ,

a

consent to adoption does not change the domicile of a minor (App.
Br. at 34-35).

This d i s c u s s i o n shows that even under the t r i a l

court's own reasoning,

jurisdiction, over the present proceeding

remained with the Navajo Nation.
Where the Navajo Nation has undisputed j u r i s d i c t i o n

9
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over a minor child, and that jurisdiction is challenged (by the
acts of the aunt in removing Jeremiah from the reservation, or
the mother in consenting to adoption, or the state court in
receiving the consent), the challenge must take place in the
tribal court.

"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as

appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both
Indians and non-Indians,

[citations ],"

Santa Clara Pueblo v.

Martinez, supra, 436 US at 65-66, and state court authority is
completely preempted where these essential tribal interests arose
on a reservation.

The ICWA preserves this exclusive tribal

authority, and wherever the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe
is an issue, it is the tribal court which should first determine
jurisdiction.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed this rule

in National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow TrJJje, 53 USLW 4649
(June 3, 1985), where the Court concluded that
the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal
sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has
h
oon a
H o r A ^ .
H i v p s f p r i . or
nr
HiminiRhp^.
a s well
W P I 1 as
as a
a
been
altered,
divested,
diminished,
as
detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and
administrative or judicial decisions.
We believe that examination should be conducted in
the first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our
cases have often recognized that Congress is committed
to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and
self-determination. That policy favors a rule that
will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being
challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the
factual and legal bases for the challenge.
53 USLW at 4652.

10
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In the present case the aunt who removed Jeremiah from
the Navajo reservation testified that her intent was to avoid the
involvement of the Navajo Nation in the placement of Jeremiah
(Transcript I, p. 62, line 18 to p.63, line 17). The propriety
of this action was never checked with the Navajo tribe to determine whether it was valid under Navajo law.

In addition, by

denying the tribal court the right to determine its jurisdiction
first, the trial court wrongly divested the tribe of the right to
apply its own cultural standards to Jeremiah.

The tribe argued

repeatedly throughout this case that under Navajo custom the
maternal grandmother had a legal responsibility to care for
Jeremiah, and that under Navajo custom a Navajo mother has no
power to cut off the legal rights of extended family members by
executing a consent to adoption.
Adoption.

App. Exhibit B.

See Navajo Common Law of

Yet the trial court completely

ignored the constitutionally protected right of the Navajo Nation
to the practice of its own culture, and applied alien legal
standards in holding that under Utah law the mother has the power
to cut off the rights of other family members.

Whether the

domicile of Jeremiah remained on the Navajo reservation under
Navajo law, and whether the actions of the mother in consenting
to the adoption of Jeremiah were sufficient under Navajo law to
divest the tribe of its jurisdiction and the relatives of their
right to custody was never addressed by the trial court.

It was

addressed by the Navajo court in its ruling of October 12, 1984,
however, App. Exhibit H, where the tribal court ruled that the

11
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state court's ruling was completely contrary to the laws and
public policy of the tribe.

It is for this reason that the Utah

Supreme Court should give full faith and credit to the ruling of
the Navajo tribal court and reverse the decision of the state
district court.
Respondents1 brief contains no discussion in opposition
to the settled rule that undefined terms in federal statutes are
to be defined by the federal common law, because there is no
contrary law.

Instead they deliberately falsify the legislative

history of the Act in an attempt to argue that the Act leaves the
issue of domicile for state courts to decide according to state
law.

Res. Br. at 16.

This falsification occurs when Respondents

write that "many commentators recommend

(sic) that the Act

include a uniform definition of residence and domicile." Id.
(emphasis added).

These commentators were not referring to the

Act, however, they were referring to the inclusion of a definition of domicile in guidelines issued over one year after the Act
itself was passed.

44 Fed. Reg. at 67585.

The Bureau of Indian

Affairs commented on the meaning of domicile a£ the time the Act
was passed and nowhere mentioned that state law would in any way
control its definition.
section 101(a)).

House Report, supra, at 31 (comment on

See State, ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. England,

640 P2d 608, 613 (Or 1982) (definition of Indian custodian
expressly refers to state law).
Federal courts had already adopted the Restatement of
Conflicts rule, a summary of existing state law, as the federal

12
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common law for the domicile of a minor in Ziady v^ Curley, supra.
Creation of federal common law from state law requires that the
state law be consistent with the purposes of the underlying
federal statute, and the Bureau's certification that existing
state law definitions of domicile were consistent with the
purposes of the ICWA fulfills that requirement.
67585.

44 Fed. Reg. at

Nowhere, however, does this statement by the Bureau

indicate that state law controls the outcome of domicile.
The trial court did not follow existing law, however,
in determining the domicile of Jeremiah Halloway; instead it
created new law.

Even the BIA Guidelines did not authorize such

a tactic. The statement of the Bureau, issued in 1979, stated
that state law existing at that time defined domicile in a manner
consistent with the purposes of the ICWA.

The trial court used

the doctrine of in loco parentis to justify its ruling that the
domicile of Jeremiah had unilaterally shifted from the Navajo
reservation to Utah, Order of October 6, 1983, No. 4, but this
doctrine does not apply to anyone except

blood

relatives.

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, Section 22, comment i.
Once again the Respondents are selective in their
citation of relevant law in an attempt to obfuscate the truth.
As Respondents quote the Restatement (Resp. Br. at 17), comment i
(the in loco parentis doctrine) does say that the doctrine should
apply to persons who are not blood relatives. But this is only a
recommendation; it is not existing law.

The sentence before

this, which Respondents conveniently omit from their brief,

13
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states:

"To date, the cases have placed the child's domicile, in

the circumstances dealt with here, at the home of a grandparent
or other close relative." (emphasis added).

This statement is

the existing law, and the ruling of the trial court on this point
was clear error.
In addition, before the adoption of new state law can
be considered for purposes of the federal common law, such new
law must comport with the underlying policies of the federal
statute. E.g., Ziady v. Curley, supra. A cursory glance at the
policies of the ICWA is clear evidence that the in loco parentis
doctrine cannot be extended under the ICWA to non-Indian
strangers.

The Act is designed to keep Indian children with

their families, to defer to tribal judgment on Indian child
custody matters, and to place Indian children within their own
culture.
A.l

BIA Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67585, Section

(Policy).

Any result contrary

strongly disfavored.

1^3. at 67586.

to these preferences is
Yet what is the result if

the new doctrine of in loco parentis created by the trial court
is adopted?

1

Removal of Jeremiah from the family with no oppor-

tunity to contest is upheld, the tribe is divested with no say

1

from exercising any authority over its children, and the place- i
ment of Jeremiah in a non-Indian home in violation of the placement preferences is ratified.

The trial court's ruling on this

I

issue therefore must be rejected.
Only one case is cited by Respondents to justify this fl
result, Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P2d 64 (Utah, 1978).
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This case

]

I

does not discuss the effect of the in loco parentis doctrine on
the issue of domicile.

Gribble concerned only the rights of a

step-father as a parent under a specific Utah statute, UTAH CODE
ANN. Section 30-3-5, where the father already had legal custody
of the child under a court order.

583 P2d at 68. The Court also

noted that a specific hearing would have to be conducted on
whether the step-father should be granted any other in loco
parentis rights beside a statutory right of visitation, Id. at
68, and noted that in general a step-parent
conferred no legal rights at common law.

relationship

Id. at 65. A case more

on point is Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P2d 773
(1958), where the Utah court ruled that domicile remained with
the mother despite her initial attempt to abandon all parental
rights.
Respondents also cite another section of the Restatement to justify their contention that the domicile of Jeremiah
could shift away from the Navajo reservation, but this argument
makes no sense.

Resp. Br. at 18.

Respondents argue that an

"emancipated" child can acquire his own domicile upon being
abandoned by the parents.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws,

Section 22, comment f. But emancipation only applies to children
who have become "adults" and who no longer need the supervision
of a parent.
year-old

Respondents cannot seriously argue that a three

infant became emancipated

in the present case.

Respondent's recitation of several Utah cases on abandonment to
justify this position is therefore completely irrelevant.
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See

Restatement

Section 22, comment e (domicile of an abandoned

child) .
The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Matter
2l Appeal j.n Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P2d 18 7
(Ariz App 1981), cert denied, 455 US 1007 (1982), is identical in
its important facts to the present case.

It should first be

noted that the trial court attempted to diminish the impact of
the Pima County case by altering the facts.
1985, pp. 6-7.

Order of January 28,

The trial court states that the adoptive parents

only had custody of the child for four months in Pima County, But
the important issue here is abandonment, and the natural mother
in Pima County had met the statutory requirement by giving up
custody of her child for over six months.

635 P2d at 190. Thus

in both cases the mother had "abandoned11 their child as required
by state law.
adoption.

Both parents had executed a voluntary consent to

Both parents had revoked their consents.

the Pi.ma County case even had worse facts.
case was not living on the reservation.

In addition,

The mother in that

The adoptive parents

were given legal custody of the child under a temporary custody
order.

The child was born off the reservation.

Yet despite all

these facts, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the
domicile of the child remained with the mother on the reservation
until legally changed by a valid court order. Id. at 191. It is
this decision which should control the outcome of the present
case.
Respondents acknowledge the inadequacy of their own
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case citations when they state that none of them were decided
since the passage of the ICWA in 1978. Resp. Br. at 23. All of
the cited cases have either been overruled by passage of the ICWA
or are irrelevant to Respondents' argument.
In £e Cantrell, 495 P2d 179 (Mont. 1972), and Matter o£
Duryea, 563 P2d 885 (Ariz, 1977) have both been overruled by
passage of the ICWA.

Both cases involved a state taking juris-

diction of an Indian child where the Indian parent remained
domiciled on the reservation.

Contrary to the assertions of

Respondents, Resp. Br. at 23, neither of these cases based its
assertion of state jurisdiction on a finding that the domicile of
the child was off reservation.

Both took jurisdiction because a

portion of the child's conduct took place off reservation.

See

563 P2d at 886. This jurisdiction was based on state statutes,
see A.R.S. Section 8-532, giving a state jurisdiction whenever a
child is found within a state.

Under the ICWA a child can be

physically present off-reservation but still domiciled on reservation, and the state court would be without jurisdiction over
the child.

25 USC Section 1911(a).

The Cantrell decision was expressly considered and
rejected by the Maryland Court of Appeals

in Wakefield v.

LittleLight, supra (the Maryland court noted that in Cantrell,
"At the time jurisdiction was assumed the child was apparently
domiciled on the reservation," 347 A2d at 235. (emphasis added).
The Wakefield decision concluded that state jurisdiction should
be decided by the domicile of the child when the child first
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appears before the court.

ld^

at 238.

The holding of the

Wakefield case was expressly adopted by the Congress.

See House

Report, supra, at 21.
The Duryea decision, 563 P2d 985, supra, has also been
overruled.

Its decision was based on the Cantrell decision, and

is therefore no longer good law.

It has also been overruled by

the ICWA case of Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,
635 P2d 187, supra.

In Duryea, jurisdiction was taken because

"conduct of the parents in leaving the children...took place
completely off the reservation."

563 P2d at 887.

In the Pima

county case all of the conduct of the mother took place off the
reservation.

Finding that the mother was domiciled on the reser-

vation, however, and the domicile of the child was the same as
here, the court held that state jurisdiction was preempted.

This

decision overrules Duryea.
The other cases cited by Respondents actually support
Appellant's position that the domicile of Jeremiah remains on the
reservation.

In DeCoteau v. District Court, 420 US 425, 43 L Ed

2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082, the Supreme Court found that the land where
the mother lived was no longer part of the reservation.
mother and child were

The

therefore not domiciled on the reservation

and state jurisdiction was proper.
Adoption of Doe, 555 P2d 906 (N.M.App. 1976), also
involved a case where both the mother and child lived off the
reservation.

Id. at 916-917.

Since the child was not domiciled

on reservation, state jurisdiction was proper.
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Jurisdiction

where the mother is domiciled on the reservation is covered by
Matter ot Adoption ot a Baby Child, 700 P2d 198 (N.M. App. 1985).
Doe was also attacked by Congress because it held that a Navajo
grandfather's right to custody under Navajo custom would not be
recognized by state law, and that "New Mexico need not subordinate its own policy to a conflicting Navajo custom."
913-914.

In the ICWA

555 P2d at

Congress specifically defined "Indian

custodian," 25 USC Section 1903(6), to give extended family
members legal rights to custody.

See House Report, supra, at 20

("While such a custodian may not have rights under state law,
they do have rights under Indian custom which this bill seeks to
protect").

Doe is no longer good law.
Respondents have cited no cases since passage of the

ICWA because there is no law which supports their position.

The

decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Matter of Appeal in
Pima County Juvenile Action, supra, 635 P2d 187, and the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in Matter of Adoption of a Baby Child,
supra, 700 P2d 198, control the present case.

Both cases held

that the domicile of an Indian child remains that of the mother
until a decree of adoption is granted.

The decision of the Utah

Supreme Court in Application of Morse, supra, 7 Utah 2J 312, 324
P2d 773, is entirely in accord with these cases.

The Court

should find that the District Court was without jurisdiction over
Jeremiah Hallway in the present proceeding.
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POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT TERMINATING
THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL MOTHER WITHOUT A
FINDING OF UNFITNESS, AND GRANTING A
DECREE OF ADOPTION, WAS IN ERROR,
The Navajo Nation argued in its opening brief to this
Court that the Indian Child Welfare requires a finding of unfitness on the part of the parent before parental rights can be
terminated.

Respondents1 brief in response is the most eloquent

argument possible that the Navajo Nation is correct on this
point.

Out of a 15 page discussion on the standard for termina-

tion (Resp. Br. pp. 34-49), one page (Resp. Br., p.46) is spent
on circumstantial and irrelevant evidence of fitness. Respondents spend one sentence (Resp. Br. p. 35) on their argument that
the ICWA does not require a showing of unfitness before parental
rights can be terminated.
history is cited.

No statutory authority or legislative

No case law is cited because all of the ICWA

case law is completely opposed to Respondents1 argument.

E.g.,

Matter of Appeal in Pi.ni a County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 6 35
P2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981), cert, denied, 455 US 1007 (1982).
Apparently, Respondents' argument is to be accepted on faith
alone.
Respondents concentrate instead on two arguments:

1.

that termination is justified because Jeremiah is so bonded to
his present custodians that removal in and of itself will cause
him emotional harm; and 2.

that the natural mother, Cecelia
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Saunders, abandoned Jeremiah under Utah law.

Both of these

arguments are irrelevant, however, to the present proceeding.
The ICWA does not permit abandonment as a justification for
termination of parental rights, and conflicting Utah law is
therefore preempted.

Termination based solely on the condition

of the child, without finding any unfitness on the part of the
parent, violates the U.S. Constitution, the ICWA, Utah law, and
Navajo law.
The ICWA establishes one standard for termination of
parental rights, a finding "that the continued custody of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 USC
Section 1912(f).

This standards preempts all conflicting state

law regarding termination.

E.g. House Report No. 1386, 95th

Cong, 2d Sess. 19 (1978), reprinted at 1978 U.S. CODE, CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7541 ("While the committee does not feel that it is
necessary or desirable to oust the States of their traditional
jurisdiction...it does feel the need to establish minimum Federal
standards and procedural safeguards in State Indian child custody
proceedings....").

See 25 USC Section 1921.

The ICWA standard requires a showing that the parent is
unfit.

See Matter of Appeal in Pima County, supra, 635 P2d at

192 ("the

issue in these termination proceedings is...the

unfitness of the parent"), and as such is identical to the
requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-38-48(a).

This section

requires a finding "That the parent or parents are unfit or
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incompetent by reason of conduct or condition which is seriously
detrimental to the child...."

(emphasis added).

A quick glance

at the ICWA shows that the same showing is required under its
terms.

The Act requires that:

"The evidence must show the

causal relationship between the conditions that exist (in the
home) and the damage that is likely to result,"

BIA Guidelines,

supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593 (Section 0.3(c)), and proof showing
that it is "likely that the conduct of the parents will result in
serious physical or emotional harm to the child." BIA Guidelines,
supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593 (Section D.4 Commentary).
Because the standard under the ICWA and Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-38-48(a) are identical, Appellants in their opening
brief discussed the holdings of several recent Utah cases which
addressed termination under this fitness standard.

Ijn £e J.P.,

648 P2d 1364 (Utah 1982); Interest o£ Walter B^, 577 P2d 119
(Utah, 1978); State, In Interest of E.V.J.T., 578 P2d 831 (Utah,
1978); State v^ Lance, 464 P2d 395 (Utah, 1970).

These cases

also discussed abandonment as a separate issue, but abandonment
is not the issue in the present case and Respondents1 concentration on abandonment is merely a smokescreen to divert attention
way from the Court's discussion of fitness. These cases make
clear that the grounds for termination in the present case —

the

bonding of the child to substitute custodians and the damage that
will be caused by separation from those custodians —

are wholly

improper without a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the
parent was unfit. State, In Interest of E.v.J.T., supra, 578 P2d
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at 834. This is the relevant point of Utah law for the present
case.
The argument of abandonment raised by Respondents is
therefore completely irrelevant to the present proceeding.

The

fact that the Utah Code has a separate section for abandonment,
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-38-48(b), shows that fitness and abandonment are different standards. See In re J.P., supra, 648 P2d
at 1367

(unfitness 0£ abandonment).

The ICWA contains no

language or legislative history giving any indication that abandonment is an acceptable ground for termination of parental
rights.

See Matter o£ Appeal in Pima County, supra, 635 P2d at

190 (reversal of trial court ruling that mother "abandoned" the
child).

Indeed the express language of the ICWA preempts and

excludes any termination standard of abandonment, because a
parent has the right to revoke a voluntary consent "for any
reason at. any time prior to the entry of a final decree of
termination or adoption...and the child shall be returned to the
parent"). 25 USC Section 1913(c) (emphasis added).

Congress

could have placed a six month limit on the right to revoke
consent; they did not.

If parental rights can be terminated

under the ICWA after six months of abandonment, Section 1913(c)
would be stripped of any meaning.
Respondents rely heavily on abandonment in their brief
("inasmuch as abandonment...has been proven to the trial court,
there was absolutely no need to establish a separate basis of
"unfitness" of the natural mother," Resp. Br. at 37), because
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there was no other evidence to justify the trial courts1 termination order.

There was not sufficient evidence that the mother

was unfit, and therefore the success of Respondents must succeed
or fail solely on a finding
sufficient under the ICWA.

that abandonment by itself is

The trial court itself could only

find that there was "some testimony regarding the fitness" of the
parents, Decision of January 28, 1985, p.5, but even that
evidence was four years old.
The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Matter
of Appeal in Pima county Juvenile Action, supra is directly on
point again regarding the standard for termination of parental
rights.

The trial court recognized the holding of the Pima

County which concluded that an Indian mother has an absolute
right to revoke her consent to adoption and "is entitled to the
return

of

fitness...."
193.

her

child

jLn t:he absence

of[ evidence

of

he£

Decision of January 28, 1985, p.6; see 635 P2d at

The trial court then attempted to distinguish the Pima

County case based on the length of time the Indian child had been
with the adoptive parents, finding that in Pima County it had
only been four months, less than the six months required to meet
the state standard for abandonment.

But abandonment is calcu-

lated on the length of t^me the child has been abandoned by the
natural parents, not the length of JtjLme the child has been with
new parents.

In Pima County the mother relinquished her parental

rights on March 18, 1980.

635 P2d at 189.

She requested the

return of her child on September 29, 1980, Id., more than six
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months after she first relinquished her rights. She therefore
met the Arizona state standard for abandonment.

Yet the Pima

County Court found that abandonment under state law was completely irrelevant under the ICWA, which required a showing of unfitness before return of the child could be avoided.
193.

635 P2d at

There is no legal difference between this case and the

present appeal.

Basing termination solely on the bonding and

"best interests" of the child, as was done in the present case,
has been soundly rejected by this Court.
E.v.J.T., supra.

State, In Interest of

The trial court's attempt to distinguish and

"belittle" the Pima County decision, therefore, is incorrect.
An analysis of the findings of the trial court shows
that there was no evidence of present unfitness and certainly not
"evidence beyond a reasonable doubt", 25 USC Section 1912(f),
that Cecelia Saunders was unfit.
Supreme Court clearly
termination

In j[n £e J.P., supra, the Utah

required present

of parental

rights.

conduct

to justify

648 P2d at 1377.

See

Appellants' Opening Brief at 45-46.
The findings of the trial court regarding fitness can
be divided into several groups.

The first is the adoption of

dicta from a South Dakota case that the conduct of other persons
besides the parents can be used to support a finding of termination.

Matter o£ J.L.H., 316 NW2d 350 (S.D. 1982); Decision of

Jan. 28, 1985, pp. 5-6.

This is an incorrect standard.

The ICWA

refers only to the conduct of the parent in finding grounds for
termination, 25 USC Section 1912(f).

The extension of the Act
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adopted by the trial court in the present case is not justified
by the Act itself or by any principles of statutory construction.
See BIA Guidelines, lugira, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593, Section
D.3.(c).

The ICWA is designed to protect the rights of Indian

parents to their children, not to make it easier to break the
Indian family up as the trial court attempted to do.

25 USC

Section 1921.
The J.L.H. case also does not say what the trial court
claims it says —
community

that the character of other people in the

may be grounds in and of itself for terminating

parental rights.

The J.L.H. decision at 316 NW2d 350 is actually

the second opinion of the South Dakota Supreme Court in that
case; the first opinion appears at 299 NW2d 812 (S.D. 1980), and
explains the factual background behind the second opinion.

The

court noted that the mother held drinking parties at her home and
did not exclude intoxicated people from the house.
814.

299 NW2d at

It was the failure of the mother to control the conduct of

such other persons iji her own house which was the basis for
terminating

her parental

unfitness of that mother.

rights.

The evidence

showed

the

In the present case the trial court's

finding that parental rights can be terminated based on the
conduct of other persons living in the same community oversteps
constitutional grounds in the power of a court to pass judgment
on the legitimacy of another culture and lifestyle.

See In

Interest o£ J.R.H., 358 NW2d 311, 321-22 (Iowa 1984) (cultural
and socio-economic conditions on a reservation inappropriate
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grounds to remove an Indian child).
The trial court f s reliance on the grandmother's
alcoholism (no finding was made that the alcoholism had caused
damage to Jeremiah) to justify terminating Cecelia Saunders'
parental rights is ironic, given the total rejection the trial
court gave to any legal rights the grandmother might have to the
custody of Jeremiah under tribal or federal law.

Jeremiah lived

with the grandmother for two and one-half years before he was
removed from her house by a maternal aunt who lived offreservation.

She had a legal right to Jeremiah's custody under

the ICWA (see definition of "Indian custodian", 25 USC Section
1903(6)) and under tribal custom

(See Navajo Common Law of

Adoption, Exhibit B to Appellants' Opening Brief), which could
not be cut off by the actions of the mother in executing a
consent to adoption. Jeremiah's domicile was the same as hers on
the Navajo reservation.

Yet the trial court never even mentioned

the rights of the grandmother,

and granted the adoption of

Jeremiah without terminating her custodial rights. How is it
that she has no rights to the custody of a child stolen out of
her home without her consent, yet later her alleged conduct
becomes the primary grounds for terminating the custodial rights
of a completely different person?

Looked at in this light it

appears that the grandmother was given a "legal" interest to
affect the future custody of her grandson only when it was
convenient for the trial court to do so.

The grandmother has

always resided and been domiciled on the Navajo reservation.
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Under these circumstances, what gives Utah the right to decide
whether she has a legal interest in her grandson under Navajo
custom?

What gives a non-Indian state court the right to decide

whether her lifestyle and conduct, performed completely outside
the State of Utah, is proper?

As an internal social relation of

the Navajo Nation, any examination on these issues is solely the
province of the Navajo courts. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
supra, 436 US at 65-66.
Other evidence allegedly supporting the "unfitness" of
the mother consists of a statement that the stepfather did not
like Jeremiah and did not want him in the family relationship.
Decision of January 28, 1985, p.6.

This statement concerned the

attitude of the father before Jeremiah was removed from the
reservation five years ago.
justify its finding.

There is no evidence more recent to

The present evidence is uncontroverted that

both the stepfather and mother desire very deeply the return of
Jeremiah and that they are fit custodians.
237-230.

(Testimony of Dr. Roll).

even mention this evidence.

Transcript II, pp.

Yet the trial court does not

This failure is clear error.

The trial court also attempted to characterize the
events surrounding the mother's consent to adoption and subsequent revocation of that consent as evidence of unfitness.

It

should be noted that this evidence is irrelevant since the mother
has expressed her present intent to obtain the return of her son,
is raising three other children of her own with no problems, and
she and the step-father are presently fit and proper parents.
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Aside from this, however, the court's characterization of events
is incorrect and reflects a fundamental misperception of Navajo
life and culture.
The trial court concluded that the mother willingly
gave the child up for adoption. The mother testified, however,
that she wished she had not had to have Jeremiah adopted but felt
she had no other options at the time (Transcript II, p.302, lines
17-22).

The Indian Child Welfare Act was not explained to the

mother when she consented to the adoption of Jeremiah before the
trial court in 1980.

Respondents dispute this contention, Resp.

Br., p.12, line 12, but Respondents are wrong.

A copy of the

complete transcript of the May 30, 1980 consent proceeding is
attached to this brief as Exhibit K; the ICWA is never mentioned
in that proceeding to the mother.

In addition, the mother was

not appointed independent legal counsel to advise her of the ICWA
as required by the Act, 25 USC 1912(b) (right to counsel in any
placement proceeding); .In rje M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1316-17
(Mont, 1981).

Independent legal advice was one of Congress'

prime concerns in enacting the ICWA.
Another

House Report, supra, at 11.

aspect of the consent proceeding

brought up at this point.

must be

Nowhere in this entire proceeding did

the trial court ever satisfy itself of the mother's understanding
of English.

The facts show that the mother did not fully under-

stand English.

For example, the mother's answers in the consent

proceeding were rarely more than one syllable.

Respondents them-

selves testified that when Jeremiah first appeared at their
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house, he spoke no English at all.

Transcript I, p.76, lines 13-

22).
The most important example of the mother's comprehension of English
adoption.

involves the revocation of her consent to

The trial court found (without citing any evidence)

that the mother revoked her consent only after the tribe
disapproved of the adoption and put pressure on her.

Decision of

January 28, 1985, p.6. There is another explanation, however,
which requires some consideration and understanding of Navajo
culture.

At the hearing of April 7, 1983, a Navajo social worker

testified that she tried to explain the ICWA to the mother in
English, but that the mother did not understand her.

Transcript

I, p.121, lines 1-9). A social worker who spoke Navajo came and
explained the ICWA to her in Navajo.

Id.

Immediately after

this explanation, the mother, who understood her rights for the
first time in two years, asked for her son back.
Cecelia

initially concealed

consented to the adoption of Jeremiah.

Id.

the fact that she had
Cecelia told the worker

that Jeremiah was on LDS foster placement.

When Cecelia was

finally confronted with evidence that she had consented to
termination of her parental rights, she became upset.

The trial

court and Respondents twisted this statement into a conclusion
that Cecelia was "disgruntled" because she really wanted the
adoption to go through.

Resp. Br. at 2, line 8.

There is no

independent evidence to support this conclusion, however, and an
alternative explanation is likely if aspects of Navajo culture
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are given even minimal consideration.
important aspect of Navajo society.
Adoption,

Children are the most

See Navajo Common Law of

Appellants1 Exhibit B., p. A-3 ("Child Abuse and

Neglect - A Navajo Perspective").

Under Navajo tradition, the

loss of one's child is the worst thing that can happen, and
subjects the parent to societal embarrassment and even possible
ostracism from the community.

When Cecelia was confronted with

the fact that she had given up her son, was she upset because she
really wanted to give him up or was she upset because she knew
that knowledge of her actions would

subject her to severe

embarrassment within the Navajo community.

The Utah trial court

came to its own conclusion of these events; the Navajo Nation
suggests that if these facts had been presented to a tribal court
or at least a trier of fact with some understanding of Navajo
culture, there may have been a different result.
Finally, we address the trial court's finding that
there was "testimony, although not uncontroverted, that the
mother revoked her consent only after being subject to duress by
the Navajo Nation."

Decision of January 28, 1985.

A short

review of the actual facts shows that the trial court's finding
violates all known standards of evidence, and that there was not
even a scintilla of reliable evidence to support the trial
court's finding on this point.

The cited transcript pages turn

out to be the testimony of Polly Dick, the maternal aunt who
removed Jeremiah to begin with from the Navajo reservation for
adoptive placement in Utah.

What was her "proof" of duress?
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Several sisters told her that tribal workers were harrassing
Cecelia.

Transcript I, p.61, lines 12-17.

So we are immediately

presented with the fact that this testimony is second or thirdhand hearsay, with no reliability.
hardly ever

visited

Polly testified that she

the reservation

information about the allegations.

and had no first-hand

Id. at p.66, line 25 to p.67,

line 4.
In addition, Pollyfs testimony was shown to have no
reliability.

Polly

testified

that when she first

Jeremiah to Utah, she intended to raise him herself.
I, p.64, lines 20-25.

removed

Transcript

Immediately following her testimony Dan

Carter, the adoptive father, who had listened in the courtroom to
Polly testify, took the stand.

He was asked whether Polly's

version of events was true and stated that jjt was not true, that
Polly had arranged to place Jeremiah for adoption with him over a
month before she removed him from the reservation!
lines 10-25.

Id. at p.70,

Not only is Polly's testimony hearsay, but Polly

created testimony to suit her own purposes whenever she thought
it was convenient.
The mother's testimony on the other hand was firsthand.

Subjected to repeated questions by counsel for Respondents

in an attempt to be "as clear as possible", she stated four times
when asked whether she had been forced to revoke her consent by
the tribe with a simple and eloquent "no". Transcript I, p. 36,
line 15, to p.37, line 9.

In light of Cecelia's direct testimony

and the fact that the opposing evidence consisted only of second
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or third-hand hearsay which was likely made up, the finding of
the trial court that the tribe subjected the mother to duress is
completely without merit and should be reversed.
The previous discussion has shown that the ICWA
requires a finding of unfitness before parental rights can be
terminated, and that there was no evidence presented to the trial
court that the parents were presently unfit.

Under such circum-

stances, the ruling of the trial court to terminate the parental
rights of Cecelia Saunders was in error, and must be reversed.
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POINT III
RELIANCE ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PROPERLY
OBJECTED TO, IN MEETING THE BURDEN OF SHOWING ACTIVE
REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS AND THE UNFITNESS OF THE
NATURAL MOTHER, IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Respondents1

arguments

on the

fitness

of

Cecelia

Saunders as a parent and on the evidence "proving" that active
remedial and rehabilitative efforts had been attempted with
Cecelia and had proven unsuccessful are completely dependent on
Navajo social work records which were admitted into the trial
court record, and later made part of the evidence, over the
objection of the tribe.

For example, Respondents state:

"The

most important illustration of the failure of any type of rehabilitation of the natural mother and her family comes from the
notes of the social agencies working with the family."
Br. at 27).
were

(Resp.

These notes, however, were hearsay testimony which

inadmissable

in the trial court proceeding.

A short

chronology is necessary first before showing that the trial
court's admission into evidence of these records and its reliance
on these records for termination was clear error.
A social worker for the Navajo nation, Lauren Bernally,
testified at the hearing on April 7, 1983, and stated that she
had referred to caseworker notes in preparing her testimony.
Counsel for Respondents was permitted to examine the records and
to use them in his cross-examination.

At the end of the hearing

the court made the caseworker notes "part of the record since

34
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

extensive referrals was (sic) made reference to this file and if
an appellate court has to review this matter, then I think it
would be well that they have the contents of that file as well.H
Transcript I, at 168. There was no attempt by Respondents at any
time during the hearing to formally move the notes into evidence.
It is axiomatic that documents which are part of a trial court
record are not necessarily admissable evidence.
Counsel for Respondents, however, began referring to
the notes as "admitted evidence11 soon thereafter.

The Navajo

Nation immediately objected to this characterization.

See,

Letter of April 27, 1983, from Craig Dorsay to Honorable David
Sam; Letter of May 4, 1983, from Richard Johnson to Honorable
David Sam; Letter of August 8, 1983, from Craig Dorsay to
Honorable David Sam.

The issue remained unresolved until the

termination hearing on October 22, 1984. The Navajo Nation again
objected to Respondents use of hearsay testimony within the
caseworker's notes as admissable evidence.
75.

Transcript II, pp.73,

The District Court overruled the objection of the Navajo

Nation.

Transcript II, p.76.
This ruling was incorrect, and is reversible error.

It

is a violation of Rule 805 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
involving hearsay within hearsay. See McCormick on Evidence (3rd
ed., 1984), Section 324.3.

While the caseworker notes might

qualify in appropriate situations (where a proper foundation is
laid) under the business records exception to the hearsay rule,
Rule 803(6), this does not make all statements within those notes

35
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

admissable evidence.

Admissable evidence within those notes is

limited to statements which are the first-hand observations of
the maker

of the statements.

All other hearsay opinions,

recordations of hearsay statements of other parties, and other
hearsay statements are not admissable unless they fall within
some other independent exception to the hearsay rule.

The

District Court violated this rule in admitting and using the
caseworker notes.
Other courts have easily found that such a ruling is
reversible error.

A New York decision for example, Matter of

Leon RR, 397 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. App. 1979), is directly on point.
In that case the state offered the entire caseworker file into
evidence.

The parents objected, arguing that admission of the

materials "en masse" would be severely prejudicial because they
could contain damaging hearsay.
rejected this argument.

Id. at 377.

The trial court

The Court of Appeals held that the trial

court's ruling was reversible error because of the improper
effect hearsay evidence could have on the trier of fact,
concluding:

"These considerations are pointedly illustrated by

this case in which the courts below placed strong reliance upon
hearsay evidence to terminate respondents' parental rights.
(emphasis added)."

397 N.E. 2d at 377-78. The court discussed

the requirements for the admission of each statement

in a

caseworker's notes, finding that each statement in the records
must be qualified independently as admissable evidence.

The mere

fact that the recording of statements by third parties may be a
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routine practice of the caseworker does not make these statements
reliable and "imports no guarantee of the truth...."

Id. at 178.

The court concluded that third party statements contained in
caseworker notes are inadmissable for the truth of the matter
asserted:

"[T]o construe those statements as admissable simply

because the caseworker is under a business duty to record would
be to open the floodgates for the introduction of random,
irresponsible material beyond the usual test of accuracy - cross
examination and impeachment of the declarant."

Id.

The trial court fulfilled the worst nightmares of the
New York Court of Appeals in the present case.

One example will

suffice to show the effect of the trial court's erroneous
decision.

On page 27 of Respondents' brief, Respondents quote

the results of a meeting with two psychiatrists, in which the
tribal social worker wrote down a summary of their comments.
Respondents attempt to use these statements of third parties who
were not in the courtroom in Provo to testify or be crossexamined for the truth of the statement asserted.

Indeed Respon-

dents have classified these hearsay declarations as their "most
important" evidence supporting the failure of remedial and rehabilitative services.
A cursory examination of the actual statements shows
how an out-of-court statement can be twisted and distorted by an
overzealous advocate if the rules of evidence are ignored. The
caseworker reported that the two psychiatrists were "reluctant to
testify in court of the stability of the Saunders family" because
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it would be unfair to testify on behalf of the family and not be
able to express what may be developed later."

(R. 122-123).

Respondents now assert that this proves that Cecelia's family was
unstable.

In actuality, the psychiatrists thought Cecelia was a

fit parent.

A letter from one of the psychiatrists who is the

subject of this entry, M.E. Mueller, is attached to Appellants'
Opening Brief as Exhibit A.

Dr. Mueller states:

"I have inter-

viewed Cecelia Saunders, and can find no indication from our
interview that she might have a mental disorder that would make
her incapable of caring for a child."

He cannot,

however,

testify as to whether Cecelia would be a better parent than
Respondents.

The truth therefore is quite different than the

false picture painted by Respondents of the doctors' statements,
based on inadmissible hearsay.
None of the three "expert" witnesses presented by the
Respondents testified on the fitness of the natural mother, or
questioned the care of her other three children.

Instead the

Respondents relied on a hearsay declaration, recorded by a tribal
caseworker,

for the truth of an erroneous conclusion.

The

admission of this statement, which was the main support for the
court's conclusion that 25 USC Section 1912(d) had been complied
with, was error.

Because of this erroneous ruling, the burden of

disproving the notes' characterization was erroneously put on the
tribe.

See In re Appeal in Maricopa Juv. Action No. J-75482, 536

P2d 197, 202 (Ariz. 1975)

("By considering the report over the

objection of appellant, the trial court shifted the burden to
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appellant to attack the material in the report in much the same
fashion as in a civil trial.")

If Respondents in the present

case wanted to prove that two psychiatrists found that Cecelia
Saunders was unstable, they should have subpoened the psychiatrists to testify.
The caseworker herself was at the trial. She testified
that Cecelia and Arthur Saunders were fit parents (Transcript I,
p.122 lines 2-3), and that they required no remedial and rehabilitative services to become fit parents (Transcript I, p. 124,
lines 12-23).

The trial court did not even mention the existence

of this first-hand testimony, however, and chose to rely instead
solely on declarations in the caseworker notes which supported
its conclusion to terminate parental rights.

This failure is

clear error.
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POINT IV
NO REMEDIAL OR REHABILITATIVE SERVICES HAVE BEEN
PROVIDED TO THE NATURAL MOTHER AS REQUIRED BY
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT.
One case has changed since submission of Appellants1
opening brief.

A decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals, Matter

of Charles, 688 P2d 1354 (Or.App. 1984), has now been finalized.
The Oregon Supreme Court denied review of the decision.

The

discussion and holding of the Court of appeals on the subject of
remedial and rehabilitative services is quite useful in analyzing
the testimony which the trial court held satisfies its burden
under 25 USC Section 1912(d):
The language of the provision is unequivocal: The
state "shall satisfy the court that active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services." (Emphasis in
original). To do that, the state must show that the
efforts have been made but have not worked. In the
present case, the state did not make an explicit
showing, but it points to testimony peppered throughout
the hearing that indicates that some remedial efforts
were made which were arguably unsuccessful and asks us
to find on de novo review that the showing required by
Section 1912(d) was made. We cannot conclude that the
diffuse evidence to which the state points amounts to
the affirmative showing that Congress contemplated when
it enacted Section 1912(d).
688 P2d at 1359.
R e s p o n d e n t s r e p e a t t h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t
a l l e g i n g t h a t a Navajo s o c i a l worker t e s t i f i e d
stopped working with the natural mother.
allegation

is

false.

The

worker

that the

tribe

Resp. Br. at 26.

This

was

cross-examined

by

Respondents on whether she had enough f i r s t hand information on
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this case to testify, and admitted that she did not.
I, p. 107-108.

Transcript

She testified only as an expert on Navajo policy,

and stated that the Navajo tribe does not permit the adoption of
tribal children by non-Indians.
6-7, p.124, lines 1-11.

See Transcript I, p. 109, lines

Her testimony had absolutely nothing to

do with whether the tribe actually provided remedial services to
the natural mother.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the decision of the
Fourth Judicial District Court should be reversed and Jeremiah
Halloway should be returned to the jurisdiction of the Navajo
Nation.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/[

day of December,

1985.

Mary Ellen Sloan
Craig J. Dorsay
of Attorneys for Appellants
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if:

N THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THL ADOPTION
OF: JEREMIAH HALLOWAY
Probate No. 19,981
A Minor,

CONSENT TRANSCRIPT
* * *

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of May, 1980,
the CONSENT was taken by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State
of Utah,

before the Honorable David Sam at the Utah County

Courthouse, Provo, Utah, 84601.
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1

A P P E A R A N C E S

2
3

For the

Petitioners

Mr. Richard Maxfield
Attorney at Law
Provo, Utah 84601

4
5
6
7

P R 0 C E E D I

N G S

8

9
10

THE C O U R T :

Alright, this is in the M a t t e r

of the Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway, Probate N o . 1 9 , 9 8 1 .

11 A l r i g h t , counsel

you may proceed.
CECELIA

12

DICK

13

called as a witness by and on behalf of the p e t i t i o n e r s , beingj

14

first duly sworn was examined and testified as f o l l o w s :

15

EXAMINATION

16
17 BY MR. M A X F 1 E L D :
18

Q

Would you state your name p l e a s e ?

19

A

Cecelia

20

Q

And Cecelia you are the mother of Jeremiah

21

i s that

A Yes.

23

Q

And he was born to you out of wedlock on t h e 14th

24 day of M a r c h ,

A

Halloway

correct?

22

25

Dick.

1977?

No M a y .
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1

Q

Oh,

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

At Gallup, New M e x i c o .

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And you do not know who the father is is that

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Cecelia

10
11
12

excuse

me M a y

17th?

1977.

right?

you have placed him with a couple

here in Utah County

Dan Lewis Carter and Patricia

Carter

and he has been living with them since March of this year is
that

right?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And is it your desire to have them adopt him and

15

treat him as if he were their own child?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And you understand by doing this you are giving up

18

all rights to him you can not come back and change your mind

19

and claim him?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And I have discussed this fully with you and explaine!

22

to you the c i r c u m s t a n c e s

is that

right?

23

A

24

Q Now Cecelia have you been promised or paid anything fcj

25

Yes.

doing this ?
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3

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And what was t h a t ?

3

A

4

Q

Money t h a t

t

I came up on.

They agreed to pay you $50.00 t o have you come so tha|

5 you could s i g n t h i s

is t h a t r i g h t

f o r gas and o i l ?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And I am to pay you after this so that you but

8 anything else has there been any other money?
9

A

No.

10

Q

And they are not going to pay you anything else?

II

A

No.

12

Q

And this money here

was only to pay the, for the

13 gas and oil for coming here so you could sign this consent
14 is that right?
15

A

16

Q

Yes.
And any other promise or anything else have been givj

17 to you for doing this?
18

A

No.

19

Q

Now Cecelia

you have read this consent before and

20 you are willing to sign this consent at this time wherein
21 you agree to all these things in writing?
22

A

Yes.
MR. MAXFIELD:

23

Your Honor do you have any

24 questions?
25

THE COURT: Yes, I would like Cecelia to know what
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4

1

i s your n a t i o n a l i t y ,

what you are

Indian is that

right?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And what tribe are you from?

4

A

Navajo.

5

Q

Where was your home was it in New Mexico or Arizona?

6

A

New Mexico.

7

Q

And are you a member of the tribe there in New

8

Mex ico?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And are you full blooded Navajo?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Okay, well, let's have her sign the document counsel

13
14
15
16
17

(WHEREUPON, Cecelia Dick signs the consent to adoption)
MR. MAXFIELD:And would you put the 30th right
there.(ind) Today is the 30th of May. Okay, thank you.
THE COURT: Okay, Cecelia thank you yery
(WHEREUPON, the consent

proceedings was concluded)

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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much.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellants on the following attorney:
Richard B. Johnson
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah
84603

Attorney for Respondents

VVM/U'

by mailing twtb certified copies thereof, first class mail,
contained

in a sealed envelope with postage paid

thereon,

addressed

to said attorney at the address shown above and

deposited the same in the post office at Salt Lake City, Utah on
December j7

, 1985,

DATED this

'

day of December, 1985.

Mary Ellen Sloan
of Attorneys for Appellants
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